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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(j)(West 2009) and 78A-4103(2) (a) (West 2009) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") and
Summit County (the "County") restate the Cross-Appellant,
Summit Water Distribution Company's ("Summit Water"), issue
2 raised on cross-appeal.

The double taxation issue

identified by Summit Water is more aptly a constitutional
question.

As such, Summit Water's issue 2 is restated as

follows:
Is the District Court's conclusion correct that the
assessment of the water distribution facilities of Summit
Water did not violate the uniform and equal property
taxation clauses of Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1)(a) and (b)
(2010)?1
Summit Water cites to Utah Const, art. XIII, §§ 2 and
3, as the determinative law for this issue, but does not
quote the provisions. These sections are the uniform and
equal property tax clauses of the Utah Constitution prior to
the restatement in S.J.R. 10 (2002 Gen. Sess.) adopted at
election November 5, 2002. Since the stated purposes of the
restatement was to modernize, reorganize and make technical
changes, the current language of the Utah Constitution
containing the uniform and equal property tax clauses is
cited in this brief.
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court's interpretation of a constitutional
provision is a question of law.

The Court "'reviews legal

conclusions for correction without deference to the lower
court." Meyers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 1 9, 194 P.JSd 211.
However, there are predicate findings of fact.

Findings of

fact will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Moreno
v. Bd. of Education, 926 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1) (2010)
So that each person and corporation pays
a tax in proportion to the fair market
value of his, her, or its tangible
property, all tangible property in the
State that is not exempt under the laws
of the United States or under this
Constitution shall be:
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal
rate in proportion to its fair market
value, to be ascertained as provided by
law; and
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal
rate.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS
There are two issues in this matter.

The direct appeal

of the Commission and County addresses whether the District
Court erred in its broad interpretation of the irrigation

2

exemption found in Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i)(West
2009).

The Commission and County have set forth their

Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts in their
opening brief as Appellants and limit the discussion here
only to those factual issues related to the cross-appeal
filed by Summit Water.
Summit Water argues on cross-appeal that its water
distribution facilities are taxed twice; once on the
property itself and second to the shareholders through the
assessments on their lots.
support this assertion.

However, the evidence fails to

The only evidence submitted was the

general conclusion that the fair market value of real
property with access to water is fifty percent more than
real property without access to water.
Tr. at 144-45.)

(R. 2147, Tax Comm'n

This is sometimes referred to here as the

"enhanced value."

No record evidence shows that this

enhanced value represents the fair market value of the water
distribution facilities.

(R. 2117-2119.)

Further, no

record evidence was submitted that the County Assessor added
the value of the water distribution facilities to the fair
market values of the lots.

(R. 2117-2119.)

The Commission and County dispute Summit Water's
Statement of Fact at page 5, 1 15 of its Opening Brief in
3

Cross-Appeal.

In that paragraph, Summit Water admits that

the few pieces of real property it does own were taxed at
fair market value.2

However, Summit Water then concludes

that "the fair market value of those properties, and the
properties served by Summit Water and owned by its
shareholders, includes the value of the water distribution
facilities appurtenant to those properties.'' rd.
court made no such finding.

(See R. 2078-84.)

The trial
Summit Water

failed to submit evidence on the methods used by the county
assessor to value these parcels.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONSE ON CROSS-APPEAL.

Summit Water asserts in its cross-appeal that its water
distribution facilities have been "impermissibly" double
taxed.

Double taxation in the context of property tax is

not prohibited unless it violates the uniform and equal
property tax clauses found in Utah Const, art. XIII, §
2(1)(a) and (b).
This Court, in McCormick & Co. v. Bassett, 164 P. 852,
2

These seven parcels are relatively insignificant in
value and the crux of Summit Water's argument lies with the
lots owned by its shareholders, not these few parcels. (R.
438, Fixed Asset Ledger showing Summit Water's real property
at less than .05% of the total assets.) Nevertheless,
factual statement f 15 is unsupported and needs correction.
4

854 (Utah 1917), summarized the elements required for
unconstitutional double taxation:
(1) the property must be taxed twice;
(2) the burden of the property tax falls on the same
person; and

(3) similar property is only taxed once.
Summit Water must satisfy all three elements to
establish a constitutional violation.
The water distribution facilities are not taxed twice.
The only evidence submitted by Summit Water in support of
this assertion is that the fair market values of the lots
owned by its shareholders are higher because of the
availability of water.

This argument was rejected by this

Court in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah
1970).

Because this argument fails, Summit Water also fails

to show that the burden of the property tax imposed on the
water distribution facilities falls on the same person.
Finally, Summit Water has failed to show that similar
property is only taxed once.

The argument made by Summit

Water in this regard is that municipality owned water
distribution facilities are exempt, therefore owners of lots
who purchase water from such systems are subject to taxation
only once.

Municipal water distribution companies are not
5

the same as a cooperative water distribution company.

In

any event, Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1) expressly states
that exemptions do not establish a violation of the uniform
and equal property tax clauses.
II.

REPLY ON DIRECT APPEAL.

The Court in Holliday Water has already held that the
"irrigation exemption" applies only for property used to
irrigate land for agriculture.

Even if the Court does not

accept the Holliday Water definition, the term to "irrigate
land" at the time the constitutional exemption was enacted
pertained to agriculture.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES OF
SUMMIT WATER DID NOT VIOLATE THE UNIFORM AND EQUAL
PROPERTY TAX CLAUSES FOUND IN UTAH CONST. ART.
XIII, § 2(1) (a) and (b) .

Summit Water contests on cross-appeal the District
Court's ultimate conclusion that Summit County's assessment
of its water distribution facilities was not double taxation
in violation of the Utah Constitution.

The District Court

made a variety of conclusions and findings in support of its
ultimate conclusion on this issue, any one of which require
the ultimate conclusion to be sustained. (See Findings of

6

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, October 6, 2009, pp. 1114. Addendum D, Commission's and County's Opening Brief
discussed infra.)

(R. 2117-2120.)

The Utah Constitution does not prohibit double taxation
per se in the property tax context.

Double Taxation is only

prohibited if it violates the uniform and equal property tax
clauses found in article XIII, § 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Utah
Constitution.

See McCormick & Co. v. Bassett, 164 P. 852,

854 (Utah 1917) (holding that double taxation is only a
constitutional violation if it violates the uniform and
equal property tax clauses of the Utah Constitution).
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2 provides:
(1) So that each person and corporation
pays a tax in proportion to the fair
market value of his, or its tangible
property, all tangible property in the
State that is not exempt under the laws
of the United States or under this
Constitution shall be:
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal
rate in proportion to its fair market
value, to be ascertained as provided by
law; and
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal
rate.
This Court in McCormick identified the elements that
must be proved for double taxation to violate these clauses.
164 P. at 854.

The Court stated:
7

It is not contemplated that, when
property is once assessed for general
taxes according to its value and at the
same rate as other property subject to
the same tax is assessed, it may again be
taxed in some other way when the burden
of both taxes falls on the same person,
while other property subject to the same
tax is assessed but once.

Id.
Based on McCormick, the required elements for a
constitutional violation are:
(1) the property must be taxed twice;
(2) the burden of the tax must fall on the same person,
and

(3) similar properties are taxed only once.
Summit Water failed to prove any of these elements.
See also Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371, 372
(Utah 1970) (holding that the McCormick elements were not
met in the case of a culinary water company like Summit
Water).
Summit Water's double taxation argument hinges on the
assumption that its water distribution facilities have been
assessed to the real property "lots"' owned by its
shareholders.

Summit Water offers no evidence showing that

the assessor made a specific addition to the fair market
value of the lots for the water distribution facilities.
8

Rather, Summit Water offers appraiser testimony that the
fair market value of a lot with water available is worth 50%
more than a lot without water available.

(See Summit

Water's Opening Brief in Cross-Appeal, at 4, f 9.)

This

argument fails to satisfy the McCormick elements^
A. The same property is not taxed twice.
The assessment at issue here is on the water
distribution facilities owned by Summit Water.

Summit Water

asserts that its property is taxed twice: once in
assessments on lots owned by its shareholders and second, by
an assessment of its water distribution facilities as
separate property.

Summit Water argues that the fair market

values of the lots are 50% higher than lots without access
to water and this 50% increase represents the value of the
water distribution facilities.
The District Court rejected this argument by making the
following conclusions and findings: (1) concluding that
water distribution facilities and the lots of the
shareholders are not the same property;3 (2) holding that

3

The District Court held: "15. Summit Water is a legal
entity having a separate and independent existence from its
shareholders. The taxation of one is not necessarily the
taxation of the other." (R. 2118; Commission's and County's
Opening Brief, Addendum D, at 12.)
9

the lot's enhanced value due to water access does not mean
that the value of the water distribution facilities have
been assessed twice;4 and (3) finding that no evidence
showed that the assessments on lots separately added the
fair market value of the water distribution facilities.5
1.

Shareholder Lots Are Not the Same
Property as Summit Water's Distribution
Facilities.

The lots of the shareholders are not the same property
4

The District Court concluded as follows: "22. Although
nearby facilities and buildings may increase or decrease a
property's fair market value, it cannot be concluded that
the value of those facilities or buildings necessarily
corresponds to the increase or decrease, or that facilities
and buildings should not therefore be taxed, or should be
taxed differently." (R. 2120; Commission's and County's
Opening Brief, Addendum D at 14.)
5

The District Court found in its decision the
following: "17. Summit Water has failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence the amount, if any, the value
of the Water Distribution Facilities that was, is, or would
be included in the valuation of the real property owned by
its shareholders and serviced by the facilities. 18. Summit
Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that any increase in the assessed valuation of real property
serviced by the Water Distribution Facilities is solely
attributable to the value of the facilities. 19. Even
assuming that any such increase is solely attributable to
the value of the facilities, Summit Water has failed to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 50% increase in
the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the
water made available by the Water Distribution Facilities is
a proper measure of the facilities." These are all findings
of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. (R.
2118-2119; Commission's and County's Opening Brief, Addendum
D at 12 and 13.)
10

as the water distribution facilities.

As a result, the

water distribution facilities can be separately assessed at
their fair market value.

See Holliday Water, 466 P.2d at

374 (holding that "the Constitution did not provide that
culinary water rights and the facilities used to^distribute
them were not to be separately taxed . . . . " ) .

The concept

that Utah law requires the separate assessment of the water
distribution facilities is self evident: a constitutional
exemption exists to exempt property used to "irrigate
lands."

Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i)(West 2009).

Such

exemption would not be necessary if Utah law did not require
separate taxation of irrigation property.
Summit Water cites only one case to suggest that its
water distribution facilities cannot be separately assessed.
See Brady Irr. Co. v. Teton County, 85 P.2d 350 (Mont. 1938)
(holding that dams, ditches and canals that are appurtenant
to real property have no separate use under Montana law).
Summit Water does not explain how Brady applies to its
situation that consists of culinary water distribution
facilities not on the lots.

In any event, the reasoning in

Brady has long been rejected by most, if not all,
jurisdictions.

Storrie Project Water Users Ass'n v.

Gonzales, 209 P.2d 530, 535 (N.M. 1949).
11

In Storrie, the

court declared:
Not a single state, except Montana
[referring to Brady1/ so far as our
research discloses, has adopted the
practice of assessing the physical works
of mutual benefit irrigation districts,
such as the one here involved, in the
enhanced value of the lands irrigated
without the help of a statute or a
Constitutional provision.

Id.
The New Mexico Supreme Court based its rejection of the
Brady analysis on the premise, similar to Utah law, that
"all tangible property is subject to taxation" and "any such
property is presumed to have some value, even though it be
only a nominal one."

85 P.2d at 534; accord Utah Const.

art. XIII, § 2(1).
2.

The Alleged Enhancement of Lots Does Not
Result in Double Taxation.

The District Court correctly held that the
"enhancement" theory does not constitute double taxation.
This Court in Holliday Water held that the enhancement of
residential property from access to water does not mean that
water facilities owned by a water company were double taxed.
466 P.2d at 374.
The holding in Holliday Water, 466 P.2d 371, is
supported by Storrie,

209 P.2d at 535.

12

The Storrie court

reasoned that the value of any property is affected by its
location and surrounding properties.

Such fact does not

prevent such property from being separately assessed.

Id.

The District Court, in this matter, also identified this
problem with Summit Water's theory.

The District Court

noted:
The logic underlying the double taxation
argument [of Summit Water] is specious.
Property values are impacted by many
factors, including whether one's
neighbors maintain or fail to maintain
their properties, or a big box store is
built next door, or the property is
surrounded by parks, schools, green space
or other public amenities. Just because
nearby facilities and buildings may
increase or decrease a property's fair
market value, we may not conclude that
the value of those facilities or building
. . . should not be taxed.
(R. 2099; District Court Ruling, Commission's and County's
Opening Brief, Addendum C, at 25.)
Indeed, if Summit Water's theory were accepted, then
well cared for homes that cause an increase in the value of
neighboring homes would be subject to impermissible double
taxation.

Or, alternatively, if Summit Water's arguments

are taken to the extreme, the increased value in the
neighboring homes should be deducted from such homes and
added to the value of the well cared for homes.

13

Such a

result is unworkable.

See Storrie 209 P.2d at 535

(discussing the inconsistency of the enhancement theory and
its impractical application in property tax administration).
3.

The Assessor Did Not Add a Separate Value
on the Lots for Summit Water's
Distribution Facilities.

The District Court, by rejecting the enhancement
theory, correctly found that Summit Water had not shown the
Assessor had added to the fair market value of the lots a
value for the water distribution facilities of Summit Water.
Summit Water does not challenge that finding here.
Water reached the same determinative finding.

Holliday

4 66 P.2d at

535 (finding that "no evidence that the assessor, in
appraising the residences of the shareholders, added to the
valuation of the property the shareholders' pro rata share
of the assessed valuation of the water system.").
For these reasons, Summit Water's distribution
facilities have not been taxed twice.
B.

The Tax Burden Does Not Fall on the Same
Person.

For reasons similar to those stated in Section I.A, the
tax burden also does not fall on the same person.6

6

The

The District Court stated in its decision: "20.
Summit Water has not shown by a preponderance of the
14

property tax here falls upon property owned by Summit Water
and Summit Water bears the burden to pay the property tax.
In contrast, the property tax assessed on the lots of Summit
Water's shareholders falls upon the respective owners, not
Summit Water.7

evidence that the increase in the assessed valuation of real
property attributable to the water made available by the
Water Distribution Facilities corresponds to the
proportional value of the facilities imputable to the
shareholder. In other words, there is insufficient evidence
correlating the use of the Water Distribution Facilities by
a given parcel, the parcel's proportional share of the value
of the Water Distribution Facilities based on such use, any
increase in the value of the parcel attributable to the
water supplied. 21. Summit Water has failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that, if the Water
Distribution Facilities were taxed, the amount that should
be passed on to its shareholders in proportion to the
increase in value to the shareholders' property that is
attributable to the water supplied by the facilities by the
property. In fact, the classes of shareholders would appear
to bear apportionment and assessment of operating expenses
differently, based on class and number of shares held,
without taking into account the nature and extent of water
usage or the distance between the source and terminus." (R.
2119; Commission's and County's Opening Brief, Addendum D at
13. )
7

Summit Water also owns seven parcels of real property
and alleges that the value of the water distribution
facilities were partially included in the assessments for
these parcels similar to the lots of its shareholders. Such
parcels contain only a small portion of the water
distribution facilities. (R. 438, fixed asset ledger showing
Summit Water's real property at less than .05% of the total
assets). More importantly, the issue of double taxation is
a valuation issue and Summit Water did not contest the
valuation of the lots below and should not be permitted to
raise it here under the guise of a double taxation argument.
15

In McCormick, the Court found that a property tax upon
the capital stock of a bank violated the constitutional
provisions of uniformity when, at the same time, a property
tax was imposed upon real property effectively owned by the
bank. 164 P. at 855.

McCormick essentially concluded that

the manner of valuing the capital stock, by using the
capital account, represented the real estate which was also
subject to tax. Icl.

Lots owned directly by shareholders of

a water distribution company are not representative property
of the water company's distribution facilities, which are
separate tangible property.
It is important to note that the conclusions made in
McCormick were aided by a specific statutory scheme not
present here.

The statutes authorizing the imposition of

the property tax upon capital stock expressly required the
value of the real estate of the bank subject to tax to be
deducted from the value of the capital stock, presumably to
make the statutes compliant with the Constitution. Icl. at
854 (stating that "[t]o meet the requirements of the
Constitution [the uniform and equal clauses] in that regard,

See Woodbury AmSource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28,
f 190, 73 P.3d 362 (concluding that a double taxation
argument must be contested as a valuation case).
16

in so far as they relate to the taxation of the capital
stock and assets-property-of banking corporations, the
Legislature presumably enacted sections [1907 Utah Laws §§
2505, 2507, 2508 and 2509 specifying the method of valuation
and deductions from value for capital stock]").
Here, the double tax argument lies with two separate
tangible properties, both of which have their own fair
market value.

In contrast, the statutory method used in

McCormick to calculate the value of the capital stock
expressly included the value invested in the real estate and
required a deduction for real estate in proportion to the
"value of the capital stock surplus, reserve and undivided
profits of such bank . . . ."

1907 Utah Laws § 2509.

Finally, if double taxation has occurred as alleged, it
is not Summit Water who bears the burden of both taxes.

At

best, it would be the owners of the lots, the shareholders.
The shareholders should be the party making the claim.

See

McCormick, 164 P. at 852 (the shareholder, the bank, brought
the action).

Sound policy justifies this result so that the

actual assessments of the lots are presented before the
trial court or administrative body to consider the methods
and valuation techniques used by the assessor. See Woodbury
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, 1 190, 73
17

P.3d 362 (emphasizing that double taxation arguments require
an analysis of the "appraisal methodology that the county
assessors may, or may not, have used when assessing their
property"). Further, Woodbury made it very clear that the
procedures to claim a refund are limited and must be
precisely followed.

Ld. at 1 15.

Shareholders should not

be permitted to circumvent these procedures through Summit
Water's claim here.
C.

Summit Water Has Failed to Show That Similar
Property Is Only Assessed Once.

Even if Summit Water can show that its water
distribution facilities are taxed twice, and the burden of
such tax falls on the same person, it cannot show that other
similar property is taxed only once.

Summit Water asserts

that its shareholders are taxed twice while residential
owners who are serviced by exempt municipal corporations or
individual facilities are only taxed once.
evidence to support this allegation.

There is no

The District Court

correctly found "Summit Water has not carried its burden of
proof in establishing that, if the Water Distribution
Facilities were separately taxed as personal property, there
would be an impermissible variation in the manner in which
the facilities are taxed compared to other personal

18

property. . . ."

(R. 2120; Commission and County's Opening

Brief, Addendum D; 1 23 at 14.)
Summit Water's premise is that because municipal water
distribution facilities are exempt, its shareholders are
taxed twice, while municipally serviced property owners are
taxed only once.

This argument fails as a matter of law.

The uniform and equal property tax clauses of the Utah
Constitution expressly do not apply in the case of an
exemption.

The Utah Constitution states: "all tangible

property that is not exempt under the laws of the United
States or under this Constitution shall be: (a) assessed at
a uniform and equal rate . . . ." Utah Const, art. XIII, §
2(1)(emphasis added).

If exemptions were a basis to

establish a violation of the uniform and equal property tax
clauses, then the existence of any exemption would cause the
taxation of non-exempt property to violate the uniform and
equal property tax clauses.
Summit Water's unsubstantiated assertion that
"individual facilities" are also not subject to separate
taxation must also fail.

There is no evidence as to what

these individuals facilities are, whether they are exempt
under the irrigation exemption, or whether they were added
to the valuation of the real property upon which they may be
19

located.
For these reasons, Summit Water has failed to establish
a violation of Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1)(a) and (b).
II.

COMMISSION'S AND COUNTY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
THEIR BRIEF ON THE IRRIGATION EXEMPTION.
A.

Summit Water Fails to Distinguish Holliday
Water, the Only Case Addressing the Term
"Irrigating Land" in the Context of the Utah
Constitution's Irrigation Exemption.

The only case addressing the terms "irrigating land" or
"to irrigate land" as presently found in the irrigation
exemption contained in Utah Const, art. XIII § 3(1)(i) (West
2009) is Hollidav Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah
1970).

There, the Court held that the term "irrigating

land" should be "strictly limited" to the "agricultural
sense."

Id. at 372.

Holliday Water expressly sustained the

same conclusion by the trial court.

The trial court relied

in part, upon 30 Am. Jur. Irrigation § 2 (1958) to define
the term "irrigation").

.Id. 372.

This definition in its

entirety reads:
[i]rrigation is defined as the artificial
watering of agricultural
land in regions
where the rainfall is insufficient for

crops. The ordinary

and

popular

conception
denotes the application of
water to land for the production
of
crops,
the term embraces all artificial
watering of lands, whether by channels,
20

by flooding, or merely by sprinkling.
30 Am. Jur. Irrigation § 2 (1958)(emphasis added).
Summit Water does not directly contest the Commission's
argument that the phrase in the Court's definition,
"embraces all artificial watering of land" refers, to the
mode or manner in which irrigation can be performed, rather
than the meaning of the term.

Instead, Summit Water

attempts to dismiss the cited definition as ambiguous.

The

cited definition is not ambiguous and the Commission's
interpretation is supported by the full language of the
cited definition.
Summit Water's argument that the Court in Holliday
Water did not need to limit the term "irrigating land" to
the "agricultural sense" to sustain the trial court misses
the point.

The Court in Holliday Water defined the term

and, in so doing, limited it to agriculture.

As a result,

for the past forty years, at a minimum, this has been the
law in Utah.
Contrary to Summit Water's assertion, the Holliday
Water Court did need to define "irrigating land."

To

determine whether the property qualified for the irrigation
exemption, the Court had to determine whether the use fell
within the exemption or outside of it.
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The Holliday Water

Court drew the line by defining the term "irrigating land."
This definition, coupled with the strict construction
requirement for tax exemptions, requires that the irrigation
exemption be limited to agriculture.

See Corporation of the

Episcopal Church v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P ^ d

556, 558

(Utah 1996)(holding that tax exemptions must be "strictly
construed.").

Moreover, "[t]he burden of establishing the

exemption lies with the entity claiming it . . . ."
(citations omitted).

Id.

Summit Water has provided no other

case law addressing the terms "irrigate" or "irrigating
lands" in the context of the irrigation exemption.

Indeed,

none of the cases cited by Summit Water define the terms.8
These cases simply use the terms in passing for descriptive
purposes; a variety of words could have been used in their
place.

The use of these terms for descriptive purposes

fails to aid Summit Water in overcoming its burden to show
it is entitled to an exemption.
B.

Summit Water Incorrectly Dismisses the
Relevance of the Common Understanding of the
Term "Irrigating Land" at the Time the
Constitution Was Enacted.

In the event the Court does not find the definition in

Summit Water cites to Mt. Olivet Ass'n v. Salt Lake
City, 235 P. 876 (Utah 1925), and In re Gen. Determination
of Water Rights, 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1.
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Holliday Water controlling, then it must render its own
definition.

The Commission and County provide support in

their opening brief that the term "irrigating land" used
when the exemption was adopted is commonly associated with
agriculture.

Summit Water suggests a broader meaning.

Even if Summit Water's proposed definition is
plausible, where two plausible definitions exist, the Court
can consider the common and ordinary meaning at the time of
the enactment of the Utah Constitution.

American Bush v.

City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 1 12, 140 P.3d 123
(stating that the "goal of this analysis is to discern the
intent and purpose of both the drafters of our constitution
and, more importantly, the citizens who voted it into
effect.").
The Commission has provided two definitions from
dictionaries in the 1890s.
at 16.)

(See Appellants' Opening Brief

These excerpts show that the ordinary use of the

term "irrigation" pertained to agriculture.

Given that tax

exemptions are strictly construed, these definitions require
that the Court limit the irrigation exemption to
agricultural purposes.
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C.

Strict Construction of the Term "Irrigating
Land" Will Not Lead to Absurd Results.

Summit Water asserts that the Commission's
interpretation will lead to absurd results.
difficulties exist in applying any exemption.

Certainly,
Presumably,

that is one reason why exemptions are narrowly construed.
However, the difficulties in administering the exemption are
far less under the Commission's interpretation than those
created by the District Court's expansive exemption.

For

example, Summit Water could only establish the amount of
water used for "irrigating land" through statistics by
comparing winter and summer usage of its customers.
243-250, 875-882.)

(R.

Certainly, one might surmise that a

significant portion of the increased usage in summer did not
at all relate to irrigating land.

A portion of the

increased summer usage could be related to the filling of
swimming pools, washing cars, or other outside uses not
related to "irrigating land" under any reasonable
definition.

This imprecise measurement is the direct

consequence of the District Court's broad interpretation.
Further, the expansive definition of the District Court
potentially expands the definition to include sprinkler
systems of homeowners and golf courses.
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This raises

significant administrative disruptions that are avoided by a
narrow interpretation of the term "irrigating land."
CONCLUSION
The District Court's conclusion of no double taxation
should be affirmed.

The District Court's expansirve

application of the irrigation exemption should be reversed.
DATED this

Qjl

day of September, 2010.
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